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Abstract 
The Western Sahara recognition by OAU has caused Morocco unprecedentedly withdrawal from its African 
organization. Thus this conflictual territory of Sahara has been an unchallengeable case file in the UN tasks of 
the dispute between several actors at different times since the Spanish granted the territory to Morocco in 1975. 
This paper illustrates how Algeria has utilized the non-state actor in Western Sahara to weaken Morocco's policy 
through its territory on the one hand and reshape Morocco's foreign policy decisions on the other. Yet, Algeria's 
involvement in the Western Sahara dispute has a long- term perspective especially in geopolitical and economic 
terms not only in North Africa but also in the entire continent. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1984 following the recognition of Western Sahara by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Kingdom 
of Morocco officially withdrew its membership from the organization, becoming the only African country to 
remain outside of the organization. The paper will examine this unlikely occurrence and analyze the 
circumstances that led to Morocco's action. In this context, the paper illustrates the role played by the non-state 
actor (NSA) in Algeria and how it influenced the eventual withdrawal of Morocco from the OAU. In addition, 
the role of the NSA in Algeria was extremely important in indirectly undermining Morocco's foreign policy 
through the Western Sahara region. Since the conflict took place between Morocco and the Polisario Front in 
late 1975, the Algerian government has been the biggest supporter of the Polisario Front for Self-determination 
militarily, politically, financially, and diplomatically. 
 
There's no doubt that Algeria 's involvement in the Western Sahara conflict has a long-term perspective 
especially geopolitical and economic terms not only regionally but also continently. As long as Algeria 
supported and lobbied for recognition of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a state, this reaction 
from Algeria was unacceptable by the Moroccan government and also the International society as a violation of 
international law and the rules of the United Nations. Finally, Algeria's strategies of a challenging the kingdom 
of Morocco are basically examined as to how its actions and moves have lessened Morocco's goals towards 
Western Sahara territory as well as the insight of Morocco within the Maghreb region and across the globe.  
 
In line with investigating the relevant literature and examine the effectiveness and productivity of the interest 
group in influencing Moroccan foreign policy decisions through its territorial Western Sahara which is a 
business interest group. There requires to be an understanding of what exactly has been researched in regard to 
interest groups in terms of lobbying and impact on the interest in Moroccan Western Sahara. The core studies 
that have been done regarding the role played by non-state actors in influencing or affecting foreign policy can 
be divided into two main parts: the role played by external actors (NSA) in influencing foreign policy and the 
case of interest group in Algeria affecting Morocco's exit from the OAU. However, the interest group in Algeria 
tried to disrupt Morocco’s foreign politics in relation to its domestic affairs on one hand and with its African 
partners on the other. Moreover, the interest groups were financed by the Sahrawi Nationalists in the Western 
Sahara region in order to gain more incentives and economic interests. the purpose of the paper is how non-state 
actors or interest groups are more influential in the region of Western Sahara as well as Northern Africa. Hence, 
the paper’s independent variable lies within international politics’ level, and since the objective of this paper is to 
show how this variable of Sahara case analysis Why and How interest group have impacted Morocco's foreign 
policy decision-makers over Sahara land, as well pointing out the strategic and dynamic Moroccan position on 
Western Sahara by addressing the international community and United Nations to stop Algerian involvement in 
other countries’ internal affairs particularly Western Sahara territory. 
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2. Historical View of Western Sahara 
 
Western Sahara has been called the “old disputed desert ” on the African continent. It is positioned in the 
northwest of Africa and it has nearly about 266,000 square kilometers of Sahara land. Geopolitically, Western 
Sahara is also rich in natural resources, for instance, having one of the biggest sources of phosphate15 in the 
world and offshore. Simultaneously, it is conspicuous about the possibility of oil and natural gas exploitation. 
Moreover, Western Sahara has more than 720 miles of coastline with rich fishing resources that have attracted 
stool pigeon islanders for many centuries. Not only economic but also political reasons, Moroccan nationalism is 
based on the “myth of recovering the lost territory of Moroccan Sahara” (Western Sahara)16 – it is hard for the 
Moroccan government to compromise a solution. Furthermore, because of the unique geopolitical interest of 
powerful states, particularly the United States and France, Morocco has continued the occupation of its lost 
territory without strong pressure from the international community. Historically speaking, Western Sahara was 
formally a Spanish colony known as Spanish Sahara. Before the Spanish colonization, there was no supra–tribal 
authority connecting to a large tribal network of the region. In fact, certain Saharan tribes, based on personal 
loyalty to the sultan or king, despite the sultan’s religious authority, have contested the political authority of 
Moroccan dynasties in Western Sahara. After the Spanish recession from the region in1973, Morocco claimed 
sovereignty over the region. The Polisario Front was set up on 10th May 1973, and elated itself as the sole 
representative of the Sahrawi people, with support from the Algerian government and other African states. The 
Polisario claimed that the region was owned by Morocco. In 1884, during the pan–Arab Maghreb movement in 
the 1950s, Morocco engaged in a battle against French colonization and struggled for independence as “Arab 
Maghreb Unity” and at once, Algeria and Tunisia won independence as nation-states.  
3. The Conceptualization Analysis of Morocco and Algeria Relations and Chronological Conflict over 
Western Sahara 
Analyzing regional relations, it is irreplaceable to see how the Western Sahara impasse has conducted as 
regional conflict within several aspects. First, domestic, there is a component disagreement between Morocco 
and Sahrawi nationalists. Second, regional, the tension between Morocco and Algeria, regarding its support of 
the Polisario Front (SADR). Third, the transnational, international community have claimed to influence the 
peace process, either directly or indirectly. Due to these aspects, If we take a look at Morocco -Algeria relations 
towards the Western Sahara issue, we find out that Algeria tries to intervene in Morocco’s domestic affairs, by 
influencing Moroccan foreign policy through its Western Sahara territory (by recognizing the SADR). On the 
one hand, from the Moroccan perspective, Western Sahara was carved out of Moroccan soil by the French 
colonial. Meanwhile, Algeria has proved formally that Western Sahara was non -self-governing territory since 
the former Spanish Sahara. On the other hand, from Algeria’s side, the Western Sahara Dispute seems more 
politicalized. In fact, the Western Sahara dispute is typically a Moroccan-Algerian conflict, not Polisario's. 
Therefore, Sahrawi’s nationalist would no longer exist if it were not for Algerian support and aid. For this reason, 
the kingdom of Morocco tries to negotiate with Algeria, not the Polisario Front. 
More specifically, the two states' neighbors should promote urgent peace settlement to end the Western 
Sahara issue as African conflict and make an effective cooperation process of regional connectivity. Morocco 
stands ready to compromise extending diplomatic talks to Algeria and Polisario in a proper way under the 
principle of mutual cooperation and win-win outcomes not only to help Sahrawi people develop its integration 
and self -governing but also to gradually join Sahrawi people with Morocco through resolving Western Sahara 
dispute. Though, it was 12 years before Algeria formally decided to back the Polisario Front in 1975. From that 
time, the Kingdom of Morocco went to war against Algeria over the disputed border region. This impasse 
actually is all about Western Sahara especially when Algeria wants to have access to the Atlantic Ocean through 
the southern region of Morocco.  
Accordingly, the impasse took another direction when the French Administration in Morocco and Algeria 
never set up a clear division of sovereignty until very late. Unclear border divisions of sovereignty were made by 
the French, so French colonial maps were even inconsistent, while French Administrative separations were 
basically mistaken for the outline of sovereignty particularity had seen as an effect of competition between the 
 
15 Morocco is one of world's largest exporters of phosphate (Europa Yearbook 1999). 
  
16 See, for instance, Jacob Mundy and Stephen Zunes, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution (Syracuse, 
NY: Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict, Resolution, 2010); Yahia H. Zoubir and Daniel Volman (eds.), The International 
Dimension of the Western Sahara Conflict (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); Ali Bahaijoub, Western Sahara Conflict: Historical, 
Regional and International Dimensions (London: North–South Books, 2010); 
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French “protectorate”17of Morocco and a “colony "of Algeria. Consequently, the Kingdom of Morocco and 
Algerian borders suffered from several adjustments until the year 1901. 
Since the Spanish troops withdrew from Western Sahara in 1973, the Algerian government started formally 
supporting the so-called Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic(SADR). Justifiably, what really motivated the 
Algerian government to support the Polisario Front was to undermine Moroccan foreign policy and reshape 
domestic politics towards the territory of Western Sahara. Besides, Algeria advocated Sahrawi’s right to self-
determination18 and it balloted all the UN resolutions pushing a referendum. To the extent, Algeria’s support of 
Sahrawi people wasn’t limited to political cooperation; it took too long that when Algeria gives military and 
logistical help to the Polisario Front (SADR) especially the sale of Soviet-made weapons (Hodges, 1983). As an 
Algerian regional supporter of the Polisario Front, the government supplied the SDR with weapons and money; 
therefore, there was a large profit to be made by the militarily from this monopoly. Algeria’s back for Western 
Sahara’s Polisario Front is precisely based on the natural resources and wanted to penetrate to the Atlantic sea in 
order to ease its export of mineral resources to the Americas, particularly Latin America. True, Algeria urged to 
propose a suggestion of the Self Determination as a settlement proposal to protect its own interests. Due to this, 
Algeria has a geographically suitable route from Tindouf (the area around the Algerian border) to the Atlantic 
Ocean not over Western Sahara, but in fact through to the seaport of Tarfaya (a town in the south of Morocco) 
(Damis, 1983 pp35). Additionally, Algeria has already exported mineral resources especially oil and gas to 
Europe using a pipeline runs through Moroccan territory, though suggesting that under this proposal “both sides 
are merely capable of separation between economic and political interests” (Zoubir, 1997 pp50).  
Though controversial, between the two parties, a cease-fire between the Kingdom19 of Morocco and SADR 
was operated by the United Nations the Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINNURSO)20 and the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), which came into effect on 6th September 1991. This territorial dispute was 
addressed by the organization of African Unity (OAU). Mauritania gives up its share of the territory to Morocco, 
the organization actually was unable to assemble support for action through conflict. The Western Sahara crisis 
attributed to African infighting remained marginal with regard to global concern. After the failure of the OAU to 
resolve the impasse as part of its African Union duty, the UN waited to see what the OAU was going to do, and 
then the UN intervened to end the conflict by proposing a peace plan in the form of a “referendum”.  
Therefore, it has been almost half a decade since the Polisario right of self-determination was adopted by 
the UN. Even though the Sahrawi are struggling and waiting for the resolution, as noted above, the subjective 
circumstances of the impasse do not stand for a conclusion to be found. The recent movement of "the Gdeim Izik 
camp" event and the uncertainty of being linked with the AQIM might show that their patience has passed its 
limitation. If the related states pursue regional stability, first they should resolve the problems inside the region. 
As long as the Kingdom of Morocco and its neighbor (Algeria) end the negotiations on the issue, it will be hard 
to find a solution.  
Table 1  
 6th Sept,  
   1991 
A cease-fire is declared by Morocco and the Polisario. The UN pushes for a referendum 
to determine the final status of Western Sahara. 
   1991 Settlement Plan (Resolution 658) endorsed by the UN, proposing a referendum on 
independence, autonomy or incorporation of Western Sahara. A vote never occurs.  
   1997 Houston Agreement orchestrated by the UN to hold a vote in 1998. Morocco and the 
Polisario disagree on how consensus is to be achieved and who counts as Sahrawi. A 
vote never occurs. 
   2001 Baker Plan I proposed, which would only allow Western Sahara autonomy. Algeria and 
the Polisario reject the plan.  
 
17 (1912). “Protectorate Treaty Between France and Morocco.” The American Journal Law ,6(3).207-209.,  
18 Spector, S. (2009) “Western Sahara and the Self-Determination Debate.”Middle East Quarterly", 19(3).33-43. 
19 Kingdom of Morocco (1/7/2013): http://www.maroc.ma/en/content/map-morocco. 
20  Source: International Military Operations Training Center  
(28/7/2013):http://www.osrh.hr/smvo/Missions_en.asp?mission=MINURSO. 
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   2003 Baker Plan II proposed, creating a Western Sahara Authority which would govern for 
five years before an autonomy vote would occur. Algeria and the Polisario agreed 
eventually to the plan and the UN endorsed the plan, but Morocco rejected it due to the 
possibility of 
independence. 
May 2005 First Independence Intifada breaks out in Moroccan-held 
Territories. 
   9th Oct.,  
    2010       
Gdeim Izik set up by a protest camp in Western Sahara supported by Algeria. 
  Feb 2011 A fresh round of protests in Western Sahara, inspired by both Gdeim Izik and the Arab 
Spring protest movement. 
2010-present  Current UN Envoy Christopher Ross has held nine rounds of talks to bridge differences 
between Morocco and the Polisario over any future settlement. Algeria and Mauritania 
attend as observers. So far, nothing has happened to change Moroccan or Polisario 
positions. 
1: This table shows Chronology of the Western Sahara Dispute 
Source: Mundy. Book (2010) Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict (Ir)resolution. Syracuse 
University Press. 
The aspect of the interest group has fired upon the state-centric international system. Though it has reshaped 
the role of international relations. Interest groups have forced a change in the types of sovereignty and also 
nationalism. These factors have influenced the role of the nation-states as the actors in the field of international 
relations. The actions, decisions, and policies of the nation-states recently touched upon the rising impact of the 
presence and activities of the interest groups so far. The latter has arisen as influential nonpolitical, economic, 
cultural and trading actors in the international sphere. Highlighting the role of an interest group or non-state actor, 
Intergovernmental Organization (IGOs) and Multinational Corporation (MNCs). Keohane and Nye (1971:330) 
have examined that these factors help to build up and enlarge the foreign policy agendas of national decision-
makers by serving as transmission belts by which one nation's policies become dedicated to another. Basically, 
the interest group is always seeking mutual benefits largely outside the direct control of nation-states. Thus, these 
involve governments in certain issues as outcomes of their activities. 
Most interest groups are not organized well enough for political determinations and purposes. They often 
launch programs and spread information to enhance the professional, social, and business incentives of their 
members. Such interest group activities are non-governmental. For instance, the Algerian Oil Company 
"Numhyd 21" provides low-cost life insurance for its lobbying22 members, in order to penetrate the political field 
to safeguard their oil interests or maintained the status quo that is anticipated to be more successful than their 
own policy orientation.   
Recently the oil sector has become an attractive area for accessing and estimating the changing nature of oil 
business relations. companies like Numhyd Algerian Oil Company and Asmidal Petroleum Company have a 
 
21 John P. Entelis: Numhyd: The Political Economy of an Algerian State Institution Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, No. 
1 (Winter, 1999), pp. 9-27.  
22 The OECD (2008) describes lobbying as the ‘existence of powerful interests – corporate, private or other jurisdiction such 
as sub-national governments – that makes efforts to influence government decisions, in particular policy making, legislation 
or the award of contracts .  
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large political influence among states that need external investment due to utilizing natural reserves, and long-
term agreements give them significant finance within the anticipation of public goods and regulations among the 
state. 
Numhyd is one of the largest Algerian oil firms in Africa along with very close ties to state politics. Indeed, 
Numhyd remains an important player in the oil industry in which stay nationalized. The Algerian Government 
owns Numhyd as the prior oil company in Algeria because of military generals and high ranking officials are 
stockholders. Numhyd informally can be used as a tool to disrupt other state’s foreign policy especially seashore 
oil in the Western Sahara territory with Morocco in order to reach foreign policy outcomes. The Algerian 
government leads huge agitation to direct their alliance (African oil-producing countries such as Nigeria and 
Libya) against Morocco's position on Western Sahara. Yet, the black diamond is becoming a strategic commodity 
in the world economy and also its temptation of encouraging strategic partnerships to use. For example, Numhyd 
decided to raise oil output in North Africa and Latin America because Algeria's oil-based relationship with Libya 
keeps the Western Sahara issue unsolved, while Nigeria and other African states are partly politically motivated 
in this impasse. Consequently, examples of the Algerian national oil company in North Africa being connected to 
the geopolitical outcomes of their government. Algeria still using economic temptations, joint energy projects as 
well as lobbying OAU states and overseas for oil low pricing to win African influence.  
Numhyd has used the potentiality of oil cut-offs to the OAU and some other Latin American States such as 
"Equator, Bolivia, and Venezuela" as a threat and sometimes deterrent to recognize the "SADR" Polisario Front 
as representative of Western Sahara; also they push them to cut their political ties with the Kingdom of Morocco. 
The same thing happened with Russia when it interrupted natural gas deliveries to Europe as a result of its 
dispute with members of the USSR charging oversupply prices and transport fees.  
4. Impact of interest group in Algeria on Morocco's decision to leave the OAU 
Since the Western Sahara tension started between Morocco and Algeria, the Maghreb world’s attention has 
been focused on the prospects of the impact on Morocco's decision to quit the OAU. Fortunately, the 
governments of the two states have never lost their keen interests in holding negotiation which is seen as the 
fundamental feature of traditional diplomacy. 
To the Interest groups, they are more interested in who was made more concessions, and therefore the 
benefit of the win impact on Western Sahara formula is a little bit irritable or unbelievable. After all, Algeria is in 
general powerful than SADR, particularly in terms of core military and technologies. Yet, the reality over the 
past years showed Morocco would not trade-off on its core legitimate territory no matter how desperately the 
Algerian or Polisario tries. What Algeria should and can do is to respect Morocco's territorial sovereignty and 
engage in consultations on an equal footing to quest a mutually acceptable resolution over Western Sahara. In 
return, due to the great regional partnership of centuries of historical cooperation and political opening-up, 
Morocco agrees to further open up its foreign diplomacy and negotiations with SADR so the Maghreb 
community including Algeria can benefit from its security and stable-developing arena. But Morocco will do so 
on its own circumstances, not to suit the agenda of other states (Algeria). 
In view of Algeria. domestic opinion, there is still a decisive mood about long-term cooperation on regional 
diplomatic between Morocco and the Algerian government, even regarding some temporary difficulties between 
the two in the Western Sahara conflict. For example, at the first Rabat-Algeria talks, it reflected that despite the 
disputes at the moment, Algeria has a long-standing relationship with Morocco and the current politics would not 
break that, because it’s really a political situation. Algeria further said the Polisario-Morocco territorial tensions 
are going to be a long-term disagreement in Polisario's relationship with Algeria, and the right of Self-
determination would not impair the sharing of territory with Morocco. In the long-run, the diplomatic 
negotiations between the two parties are an opportunity to construct a new peace settlement if they have one 
compromise decision to end this impasse. Besides, the new head of the United National has long been an 
advocate for diplomatic negotiation and serious commitment and has frequently criticized AU’s engagement 
approach. Upon taking the position, Guterres has referred to UNSC resolutions as a negotiating diplomatic 
consensus that refers to the accepted framework in which the settlement of conflicts through negotiation is only 
the legitimate tactic at reaching fairer diplomatic relationships. 
In the doctrine of Interest groups, As "John Hassler Dietrich"23 mentioned that interest groups tactically are 
able to impact on the decision-making process made by foreign policymakers via three-dimensional levels: 
The first level illustrates the position of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) through the Western 
Sahara file, as well as how the OAU has failed to resolve this impasse as an African issue. This creates a lack of 
trust among Morocco and the OAU in the sense of what the OAU can do over this territorial conflict which is 
 
23 Wikipedia John H. Dietrich: levels of Interests group, p 53. 
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labeled as a forgotten case in the history of Africa. The second level is framing the impact of interest groups in 
Algeria on Morocco's decision to exit the OAU, and shape perspectives of the Algerian Government to disrupt 
Moroccan foreign policy towards its territory. Additionally, this level shows the development of the Polisario 
Front in the creation of the SADR and the rise of Algeria as the main supporter of this group over Western 
Sahara, Indeed, These interest groups have mobilized to represent a divergent batch of illegal business, labor, 
environmental, and other organizations. The third level, mention the rivalry and the hasty competition between 
the two states as hegemonic actors in the North African region.  
Basically, the current situation of the Western Sahara dispute is really complicated. First of all, there is a big 
disagreement between the Kingdom of Morocco and Polisario (SADR) supported by both the International Court 
of Justice and the UNSC, on the status of Western Sahara. Secondly, there is an alternate between Rabat and 
neighboring states particularly Algeria and Libya, over their strong support for the so-called Polisario Front over 
Western Sahara, which is perceived as involvement in Moroccan domestic affairs. Therefore, the Western Sahara 
impasse has raised the question of the regional peace and stability of North Africa over many years. Thirdly, 
there is a disparate between the OAU and Morocco on the origin of the inviolability of so-called existing state 
frontiers and practically, the acceptance of the Polisario Front (SADR) as an OAU member state. 
In effect, the OAU’s attitude and its attachment to decolonization and inviolability of existing frontiers have 
guided the recognition of the Polisario Front as a sole representative of Western Sahara territory and to the 
withdrawal of Morocco from the African Organization. In fact, several OAU state members have unresolved 
border conflicts, and the Western Sahara case might be the most complex one over Northern Africa; besides, the 
Western Sahara dispute becomes the largest context of the Arab world.  
True, The involvement of the OAU in cooperation with the UN mission to compromise a settlement process 
in Western Sahara issue was one of the OAU's priorities of accepting the so-called "Referendum" in Sahara 
region which was launched in 1991 to supervise an uneasy cease-fire between Morocco and the Polisario Front 
and hold a referendum to give the green light to Sahrawi's nationalists to ballot for either Moroccan integrity or 
self-determination24 of Western Sahara. However, the OAU and Morocco relationships were a bit fussy to 
achieve a resolution of the Sahara quarrel. Morocco formally withdrew from the OAU in 1984 over the 
recognition of Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) which indeed Morocco has rejected (SADR) 
persistently. For 30 years, the Kingdom of Morocco has not rejoined the OAU25 and remains out of the Unity 
unless the derecognize membership of SADR.  
Accordingly, the transnational conflict in Africa's Sahel region, followed by the French intervention in Mali, 
has shed light on the stalemate over Western Sahara, which has been afoot in regional power playing for several 
years. For instance, the "distance" among African relations built up by Morocco's absence from the OAU, this 
latter is pursuing deeper integration in the Atlantic sphere and strengthening of its European links, but this won't 
be in OAU's anticipation or Africa's interests. Inside Morocco, the internal reform could enlarge the 2007 
Autonomy Proposal for Western Sahara and help understanding questions concerning its viability. For Moroccan 
investment in Western Sahara territory and concerted efforts to call up a Sahrawi elite into the establishment, 
there is no existence escape of a powerful nationalist perception on the ground of an occupation. As long as the 
OAU's statements are regularly explicit it does show that Morocco may try to rethink the key arrangement in the 
autonomy proposal to oppose the powerful position of self-determination. 
For sure, OAU has failed to cure and rectify the Western Sahara deadlock as a frozen impasse in Africa. if 
OAU engaged in and interacted meaningfully, the OAU must check the Kingdom of Morocco, Polisario Front 
(SADR) and perhaps Algeria as SADR's main advocate, with the recent notion and conception to compromise 
peace process over Western Sahara. Morocco's continuing absence from (OAU) does not jeopardize constructing 
a permanent break in the organization but restricts its position and role in Africa's economic growth and 
expansion, which Morocco, given its approximate integration with the European and the Mediterranean vessel, is 
particularly well placed to play. 
5.Conclusion 
In sum, it is necessary to be aware that Algeria is still the key player in the region including the Western 
Sahara issue, its involvement in manipulating the interest group as a means to weaken Morocco's foreign policy 
and geopolitical interests. This illegal involvement of Algeria in Morocco's internal affairs will definitely create 
 
24  Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (New York, 1986), p. 124; cited in Susan 
Slyomovics, “Self-Determination as Self-Definition: The Case of Morocco”, in Hurst Hannum and Eileen F. Babbitt 
(eds.),Negotiating Self-Determination (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford, 2006), pp. 135-157. 
25 Nora McKeon :" The African States and the OAU" Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 
1944-), Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jul. , 1966), pp. 390-409 . 
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serious tension26 . Moreover, on the current ease of tensions on the Sahara impasse, it is self-evident that 
Morocco’s suspension-for proposal has worked. Moroccan government stated that Morocco's proposal has 
proven to be the right convention for the issue as it has created the basic circumstances needed for improving 
inter-Algeria relations. In order to move forward negotiations on the Western Sahara issue, Morocco has pushed 
that a self-government or "Autonomy Proposal" serves the interests of all parties, including Moroccans and 
Sahrawi people. Yet, due to this, all concerned parties should illustrate their commitment to resolving the conflict 
and bring the circumstances back to the path of peaceful dialogue and negotiations.  
 The Western Sahara crisis needs an integral process based on negotiation, persuasion, and compromise. On 
the one hand, this tension will end up destabilizing North Africa and Maghreb regions. a stable Algeria -Morocco 
political relationship is crucial for both and the African world as a whole. Consider all these, Morocco is 
proposed to use all funds to increase extensive strategic partnership with Algeria and particularly Polisario 
(SADR), to promote a sustainable peace process to end this conflict.  
References 
Arts, K. & Leite, P.P. (ed) (2007): International Law and the Question of Western Sahara. Leiden, the 
Netherlands: International Platform of Jurists for East Timor (IPJET). 
Anderson, Lisa. 1997. Prospects for Liberalism in North Africa: Identities and Interests in the Preindustrial 
Welfare States. In Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa,[M], John Entelis ed., 127-140. 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Clapham, A (2006) “Human Rights Obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations”,  in International 
Review of the Red Cross. Vol.88/No.863/Sept.2006. 
Council of Ethics, “Advice to refrain from investing in Western Sahara - Letter to the Ministry of Finance”. 
Available: http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fin/tema/statens_ 
pensjonsfond/ansvarligeinvesteringer/tilradninger-og-brev-fra-etikkradet/tilradning-om-uttrekk-
2.html?id=91683 [Accessed on: June 06.2005]. 
Damis, John (1983) conflict in Northwest Africa-The Western Sahara Dispute. [M], Hoover Institution Press, 
Stanford University, California. 
Gordon Harris: "Organization of African Unity" [J], (International Organizations; Series: Vol .7) Title II. series 
341.249, ISBN 1-85109-124-6. CLIO Press. Oxford. England. 
Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues (New York, 1986), p. 124; cited in Susan 
Slyomovics, “Self-Determination as Self-Definition: The Case of Morocco”, [M], in Hurst Hannum and 
Eileen F. Babbitt (eds.), Negotiating Self-Determination (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto,[M], 
Oxford, 2006), pp. 135-157. 
Maghraoui, A. (2003) "Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The Hague, and the Western Sahara Dispute."[J], 
Mediterranean Politics, 8 (1)., 113-126. 
Mundy, J. (2007) “Negotiations in Western Sahara: [J], The UN’s Last Chance?” Review of African Political 
Economy, 34(114). 730-735. 
Marks, T. (1976). “Spanish Sahara – Background to Conflict.” [J], African Affairs, 75(298.).  
Nora McKeon: "The African States and the OAU" Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1944-), Vol. 42, No. 3 (Jul., 1966), pp. 390-409. 
"Numhyd -Fields Development Background," [J], Arab Press Service Organization, APS Review Oil Market 
Trends 44, no. 3 (23 January 1995), pp. 17-18. 
Parker, Richard B. 1987.[M], North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns. New York: Praeger. 
Scott H. Ainsworth: The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Nov. 1997), pp. 517-533 Published by Comparative Legislative Research 
Center. 
See.https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2019/03/31/western-Sahara-round-3-into-the-final-solution/.[Accessed on: 
March 31 2019]. 
Terence McNamee, ‘Managing the Two Solitudes: Lessons from Canada’, in Jeffrey Herbst, Terence McNamee 
and Greg Mills (eds.), On the Fault Line: Managing Divisions and Tensions in Societies,[M] (London: 
Profile Books, 2012). A chapter on the FL. 
Terence McNamee, Greg Mills, and J. Peter Pham, "Morocco and the African Union": Prospects for Re-
engagement and progress on Western Sahara. Published by The Brenthurst Foundation in February 
2013,[M] Johannesburg 2000, South Africa. 
Western Sahara:" Business Law Handbook". Vol 1; Strategic Information and Basic Laws .2013 Edition Updated 
 
26 Parker, Richard B. 1987. North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns. New York: Praeger.  
International Journal of African and Asian Studies                                                                                                                           www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2409-6938     An International Peer-reviewed Journal DOI: 10.7176/JAAS 
Vol.58, 2019 
 
99 
Reprint International Business Publications, US. ISBN No: 1-4387-7142-8.[M], Published by 
International Business Publication, Washington DC. 2003.  
Werenfels, I. 2007. Managing Instability in Algeria: Elites and Political Change since 1995. [M], London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Yahia Zoubir and Gregory White: "North African Politics: Change and continuity" [J], First Published 2016 by 
Routledge. ISBN 978-1-138-92294-5 (hbk). Routledge and Francis Group, Oxon. OX 14.4 RN. New 
York. 2016. 
Zunes, S. and J. Mundy (2010) Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict [M](Ir)resolution. Syracuse 
University - Press. 
 
 
